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IMPOSING CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS
HENDRIK HARTOG*

One of the many virtues of Horwitz's essay is that he directs us
to consider the ideological continuities in American constitutional
history.1 As legal and constitutional historians learn to emphasize
diversity, complexity, and particularity, as they begin to reconstruct constitutional history as an arena of struggle between varying and contending normative orders, 2 a consideration of the constants that have channeled and structured ongoing conflicts and
positions has paradoxically become more important.
I am also reluctantly coming to believe that it may make sense
to think historically in terms of long-term political traditions.3 The
common trait shared by early-nineteenth-century urban artisans,
late-nineteenth-century agrarian populists, and a few early-twentieth-century progressives, which allowed each to become signposts
of a continuing republican tradition, is not easy to define. Nevertheless, noting continuities of language and of political posture is
important. This, at a minimum, is what the idea of a tradition allows us.
The allure of giving primacy to a liberal-republican split comes
from the possibility of defining a limited number of paradigmatic
conflicts in our constitutional history. What are the axes of such
continuing conflict? Horwitz raises two. 4 I would add a third. The

two raised by Horwitz are the claimed neutrality of the legal regime and the relative size of the legitimate political regime. First,
in all places, in all times, throughout our national history, liberals
have insisted that the legal order must maintain neutrality towards
litigants and others who come to it for resolution of their conflicts.
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. Horwitz, Republicanismand Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 57 (1987).
2. See Rights Consciousness in American History, 74 J. AM. HIsT. (1987) (forthcoming).
3. Contra Tushnet, The Concept of Tradition in ConstitutionalHistoriography,29 Wm.
& MARY L. REV. 93 (1987).
4. Horwitz does not, however, suggest that these two axes of conflict exhaust the

inventory.
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Republicans, by contrast, have believed that a legitimate legal order ought to pursue substantive visions of the public good. Second,
in all places, in all times, throughout our national history, liberals
since Madison have argued the virtues of large and extended republics. Meanwhile, those sometimes labelled republicans have almost always regarded small size as a signal characteristic of a virtuous political order.
A third and perhaps too obvious distinction between liberals and
republicans is in the idea of the citizen. For liberals, to the regret
of many political theorists, the continuing hallmark of citizenship
has been self-seeking, relatively passive, possessive individualism.
By contrast, the allure of republicanism may stem from its notion
of active, public, virtuous citizenship as a prerequisite to legitimate
government.
These differing views of citizenship reflect and enrich both of
Horwitz's themes. For republicans, small size was a prerequisite for
participatory citizenship, because a virtuous republic required the
direct vigilance of an active, unmediated citizenry, and because the
relationship between state and citizen in a republic was premised
on both a shared community of restraint and a deep suspicion generated by the potential to mask or control aggrandizements of
power. An official ideology of legal neutrality would be nothing but
a crucial indication of the corruption of the body politic. To assert
formal neutrality would be to claim a frame of reference that deviously justified the distancing of the citizen from participation in
political and legal order.
In contrast, liberals have viewed the large size of the federal government as an advantage, in large part because it would free independent, self-seeking individuals to pursue private goals, without
thereby destroying the legitimacy of the state. Citizens would not
have to devote their full time and energy to the conservation of the
polity. Legal neutrality was likewise important because of liberal
skepticism that any particular collection of citizens would itself be
neutral or disinterested or virtuous or public-spirited enough to be
entrusted with the articulation of public and legal values.
Horwitz's article shows us both the allure and the dangers of dividing our constitutional world between republicanism and liberalism. Along with Frank Michelman's recent HarvardLaw Review
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article,5 Horwitz's essay suggests the foundations for a less nostalgic constitutional neorepublicanism. As always, Horwitz gives us a
large view of constitutional history, one that allows us to see the
whole of our national history without denying the seriousness and
the significance of constitutional conflict.
I remain skeptical, however, that liberalism and republicanism
are useful categories to define the primary continuing traditions of
conflict in two centuries of American constitutional history. I
doubt whether we ought to divide our constitutional history between liberalism and republicanism. Recent scholarship has definitively demonstrated the significance of the liberal-republican conflict in the construction of our constitutional origins.' Much of the
impressive recent work has suggested the continuing availability of
republican categories of thought for a variety of groups in constitutional opposition to mainstream liberal doctrines.' I am unconvinced, however, that the vocabulary used by these groups was
necessarily antiliberal simply because it played on republican
themes.
In imagining liberalism and republicanism as competing structures, we have underemphasized the fuzziness of the boundaries
between the two at many points in their history.8 For example, determining whether free laborers in early- or mid-nineteenth-century American cities were liberals or republicans is a fruitless task.
They can plausibly be imagined as embodiments of republican values. But they were also deeply liberal, not just because they constantly quoted Adam Smith and spoke in terms of the free market,
but also because, to use Horwitz's category, they were deeply committed to notions of a neutral state. Indeed, their attack on crimi-

5. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) (discussing the conflict between the "world creating" jural
immanence of the unified community and the "world maintaining" jural transcendence of
the diversified abstract state).
6. See J. APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER (1982) (the republican vision of
the 1790s); J.G.A. POCOCK,

THE MACHIAVELLIAN

AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLIC TRADITION

MOMENT:. FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT

(1975); G.S. WOOD,

THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN

1776-1787 (1969).
7. See, e.g., Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded
Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767.
8. This is, I should emphasize, a point made by Horwitz as well. Horwitz, supra note 1, at
73-74.
REPUBLIC,
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nal conspiracy prosecutions and, later, on the labor injunction was
premised on the non-neutrality of state involvement in labor relations.' One can say, perhaps correctly, that these free laborers were
committed to notions of a neutral state for strategic reasons, but
whether strategic or not, their writings suggest a public, constitutional commitment to liberal principles that we should not ignore.
In our legitimate desire to avoid propagating a winners' constitutional history, we must avoid investing our losers with a monolithic
and ahistorical character that is untrue both to their particular circumstances and to the historical contexts within which they
struggled.
More importantly, I fear that the fashion of investing republicanism with the colors of our official constitutional opposition discourse carries definite political costs. Such an assumption may
blind us to the political and moral ambiguities that republicanism
traditionally has borne. It may hide alternative voices and alternative traditions. It may keep us from recognizing the transformative
and destabilizing visions that are a part of liberalism.
I intend to spend most of my remaining time on the first of these
unclear but present dangers. First, however, I want to say a few
words about the third danger; that is, the potential denial of the
transformative vision of liberalism. Obviously, in these cynical
days, when we identify contractualism with the Baby M. case, 10 we
need to remember the liberating potential once identified with the
idea of contractual, self-seeking, self-creating behavior. Steinfeld
emphasized this concern in his study of the changing legal understanding of indentured servitude and dependency. 1 Without historical work such as Steinfeld's, recovering a sense of the release
that a liberal political economy and constitutional order gave to
artisans who had previously been formally constrained by the le-

9. See Forbath, supra note 7. See also H. ROCK, ARTISANS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE
TRADESMEN OF NEW YORK CITY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (1979); S. WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC (1984) (New York City and the rise of the American working class from 1788 to
1850).
10. In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987).
11. R. Steinfeld, From Servant to Employee: Property and Jurisdiction in the Early Modern Master/Servant Relationship (1986) (unpublished manuscript). The same sense of transformation also pervades much of Appleby's work. See J. APPLEBY, supra note 6; J. APPLEBY,
THE ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISM

(1978).
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gaily enforceable statuses of servanthood is very difficult. 2 Similarly, one cannot read the writings' of Elizabeth Cady Stanton
without gaining renewed appreciation for the transformative potential that can be found in individualistic, contractual, self-seeking behavior. 13 For married women, as for other dependent individuals, the constitutional values of liberalism offered the promise of a
life without hierarchy and illegitimate constraints. Liberalism itself
has generated much of the criticism and the impetus for opposition
4
to liberal constitutional doctrine.'
Exactly what is republicanism after the eighteenth century?
Who embodies it as a living tradition? If republicanism is something more than just the compendium of "groups we like throughout American history," what are its salient features? To answer
these questions, let me start by outlining the substantive features
of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century republicanism, largely in
terms of visions of the citizen. We can then decide where those
features might be found in nineteenth-century public debate and
action.
What is that early modern vision of the citizen? Let me sketch
my abbreviated caricature of Pocock, one so cartoonlike that I
won't even bother to apologize for obliterating all the complexities
and subtleties of Pocock's marvelous work.' 5 The study of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century republicanism begins with the
problem of how to respond to permanent and irrevocable secular
change, change promoted and constructed by an identifiable political regime. Such change is not divine, nor is it natural. Human
agency has imposed this change, and the change is for the worse.
The question that informs the Machiavellian moment, that informs all republican political and legal thought, is who can stop or
restrain change?
Machiavelli, in particular, had an answer: an aroused and militant-and military-citizenry. Only those people who can stop
change are entitled to the status of citizen. How would they do
this? Simply, these people would demonstrate their willingness to
12. See R. Steinfield, supra note 11.
13. E.C. STANTON & S.B. ANTHONY, CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS, SPEECHES (E. DuBois ed.
1981).
14. See Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. LAW REV. 576 (1983).
15. J.G.A. POCoCK, supra note 6.
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kill their rulers. Citizens, therefore, are those who have the capacity and the willingness to kill.
The problem that a republican citizenry raises for permanent-or even temporary-government is, of course, considerable.
The resulting problem for republican political thinkers is how to
make killing unnecessary, or less necessary, or at least occasional,
without redefining the nature of the citizen. One answer, that of
seventeenth-century English thought, is property. 6
Property is the solution to the problem of killing for many reasons. These reasons do not include, however, a republican belief in
a natural or prepolitical nature of property. Horwitz is absolutely
correct that republicans saw property both as rooted in political
sovereignty and as a constellation of political decisions.' 7 Instead,
property solves the republican dilemma of governmental legitimacy
because property is imagined as a means simultaneously to constitute a citizen who is capable of taking up arms against his ruler
and to make the use of those arms unnecessary. How does property
create someone who is willing to take up arms? Because only the
man' 8s who has a stake or domain and can use these autonomous
resources to resist the corruptions of a ruler will be willing to kill
that ruler.
Conversely, by securing citizens in their possessions, by respecting vested property rights, the state imposes its own restraint, so
that the king need not be killed. To the citizenry, the ruler says,
"Look, I am respecting your property, leaving you with the material freedom to rise up and kill me. Therefore, I am not imposing
those forms of irrevocable change that would mean the end of liberty. Consequently, you need not kill me." The institution of property thus offers both the deference of the state to the domain of
the citizen, and a quasi-empirical legitimation of the state.
Property constitutes the citizen as the possessor of a domain.
What he possesses is important. He possesses a farm, but he also
"possesses" women, children, and servants. He is a smaller "sover-

16. J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY 56, 61, 68 (1985); see also J. HARRINGThe Prerogative of PopularGovernment, in THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRING389 (J.G.A. Pocock ed. 1977).

TON,
TON

17. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 69-72.
18. Note the intentional use of this gender.
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eign," able to meet the king as an equal. Both he and his ruler
possess legitimate authority within their proper spheres.
The point of this romp through the land of Pocock is that republicanism is intensely patriarchal. The maleness of the republican
citizen is not metaphoric; it is literal, it is direct, it is explicit. A
scholar of the republican-liberal conflict might begin, therefore, by
noting that the distinctiveness of liberalism, certainly in the eighteenth century, stemmed from its novel critique of patriarchy, particularly as it involved the relationship between fathers and sons. 19
Where would this feature of a republican tradition be played out
in our constitutional history? Let me describe one example.20 Why
were women abandoned by radical republicans after the Civil War?
Why were the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments passed in
forms that explicitly excluded women from participation in the reconstruction polity, even though abolitionist women had been the
constant allies of the men who would become the architects of
reconstruction?
The easy answer is that men of the nineteenth century, including radical republicans, were sexist. This, of course, is true, and
relatively uninteresting. They were, however, also racist, yet they
took their commitment to the enfranchisement of the black man
with great seriousness. Because of their republican inheritance,
they could not imagine how to accomplish this enfranchisement
without constituting black men as possessors of domains of women
and children, without making freedmen into "householders." 2 1
The abandonment of women was not easy for most radical
republicans. These republicans also believed in both the liberal notions of contractual capacity and the liberal critique of entrenched
dependency. 22 The latter could and perhaps should have led to female enfranchisement. In this case, however, visions of republican

19. For a wonderful study of eighteenth-century American culture, see J. FLIEGELMAN,
PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS (1984). See also M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985).
20. Others have identified different examples. See, e.g., C. STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN
(1986) (economic and social conditions of women in nineteenth-century New York City).
21. See E.C. STANTON & S.B. ANTHONY, supra note 13. To some extent, freedmen shared
in this understanding of the prerequisites for their citizenship. See L. LITWACK, BEEN INTHE
STORM So LONG (1979) (a historical account of the aftermath of slavery, including reconstruction and its effects on the Southern states).
22. See Brief for Plaintiff, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 45-57 (1872).
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citizenship took precedence over liberalism. The belief in how one
constituted a citizen was deeply tied to the patriarchal notions
rooted in republicanism.
This problem presents an example of real liberal-republican constitutional conflict. In this case, republicanism served as the political theory of stasis and constitutional conservatism. Liberalism, by
contrast, might have been the source of disruption and constitutional redistribution.
In conclusion, let me restate three reasons for my skepticism
about a project that would characterize our constitutional history
as a continuing story of conflict between liberal and republican political theories. First, we must consider the costs of compartmentalizing analytic categories in understanding our constitutional
past after 1800.23 Certain constitutional positions, notably those of

Native Americans, some feminists, some religious minorities, and
occasionally environmentalists, cannot be reduced to either republicanism or liberalism. Second, before we constitute republicanism
as "our" tradition, we must carefully consider whether our values
bear any resemblance to the republican structure. We can, of
course, name our values anything we want, including republicanism or neo-republicanism. At some point, however, we should recognize our own historic singularity, particularly if we become convinced, as I am, that the emotional energy that lies behind the
original republican impulse is largely unknown to us. Third, in emphasizing republicanism as the continuing alternative to the liberal
constitutional tradition, we may deny the disruptiveness and
transformative characteristics that are a part of a liberal constitutional tradition. And that, as well, would clearly be a loss.

23. A comparison with France, where political debate has at various times seemed to revolve obsessively around orientations toward the French Revolution, would certainly be in
order.

